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Abstract. In this article I will analyse the two modalities of writing which characterised Levi’s life, namely 
the technical writing of weekly professional reports, and the literary writing of poetry and short stories. I 
will above all focus on such texts as The Wrench, The Periodic Table, Other People’s Trades and the 
Essays and I will analyse the way in which chemistry lies at the basis of his poetic. The most significant 
difference between the above-mentioned forms of writing rests in the fact that Levi’s technical writing 
always describes reality on the basis of models created by sciences. Literary writing, on the other hand, 
does not reproduce a model nor describes a fixed order, because it functions as a way of representing 
the possibilities that lie beyond existence, i.e. it is a way of creating an order; literary writing does not 
restrict itself to describing an object, but instead produces new interpretations of the object, and 
consequently new interpretations of life. Therefore, I will analyse the function of metaphor because, 
from Levi’s perspective, it is necessary for good literature: in fact, thanks to its structure, metaphor is 
apt to show what cannot be described in a rigorous way, namely ethics and aesthetics. 
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1. Introduction 
 “I am an amphibian […] a centaur (I also 
wrote some tales on centaurs). And it 
seems to me that the ambiguity of science-
fiction reflects my present destiny. I am 
divided in two halves. One is that of the 
factory, I am a technician, a chemist; the 
other, instead, is totally detached from the 
first, and it is that in which I write” (Levi, 
1997a: 107).1  
In the metaphors of the amphibian and the 
centaur, Primo Levi represented not only the 
two complementary aspects of a human 
being, reason and passion, but he also 
represented the two modalities of writing 
which characterised his life: on the one hand 
the technical writing of weekly reports 
gathered along his profession as an industrial 
chemist, on the other hand his poetry and 
short stories. These two ways of expression 
have in common the fact that both literature 
and chemistry result in producing, which 
“obeys the logic of little steps, of constant 
control. It is the effort for distinguishing, 
catching also the smallest differences, it is a 
proceeding for progressing approximations, 
as in manual work and in laboratory praxis” 
(Porro, 1997: 439)2. Beyond that, for Levi 
technical and literary writing are always 
deeply dissimilar from one another: “on the 
first one, of factory, I cannot work with pen 
and fantasy. I tried to write some tales about 
my life in the factory: they are the worse. I 
will never manage, I am sure” (Levi, 1997a: 
                                                 
1 Translated by the author. “Io sono un anfibio […] un 
centauro (ho anche scritto dei racconti sui centauri). E 
mi pare che l’ambiguità della fantascienza rispecchi il 
mio destino attuale. Io sono diviso in due metà. Una è 
quella della fabbrica, sono un tecnico, un chimico, 
un’altra, invece, è totalmente distaccata dalla prima, ed 
è quella nella quale scrivo.” Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations are the author’s. 
 
2 “Obbedisce ad una logica dei piccoli passi, del 
controllo costante. È sforzo per distinguere, cogliere le 
differenze, anche minime, è procedere per 
approssimazioni successive, come accade nei lavori 
manuali e nelle pratiche di laboratorio.” 
107)3. The major difference between them 
lies in the fact that the former always 
describes the same kind of object. Regarding 
his work in factory, Levi utilised writing in a 
limited way in order to observe and describe 
synthetic polymers, which always exhibited 
the same chemical behaviour, reason why the 
writer always considered them as molecules 
“mute and raw because desperately 
monotonous, […] they have practical virtues, 
but they ‘say’ nothing, or better, they repeat 
the same message at libitum” (Levi, 1997c: 
952)4. Literary writing, on the other hand, 
does not reproduce a model, nor does it 
describe a fixed order, because it functions as 
a way of representing the possibilities that lie 
beyond existence, i.e. it is a way of creating an 
order; literary writing does not restrict itself 
to describing an object, but instead produces 
new interpretations of the object, and 
consequently new interpretations of life. 
Therefore, the metaphor of the centaur 
contains the vital contrast which leads Levi 
towards two different tendencies: the first 
aims at consistently describing the same 
order, and thus at confirming the necessity of 
nature, whereas the other aims at imagining 
new orders and at showing freedom through 
possible and plausible representations: but in 
order to be efficient, in both cases language 
has to be clear and simple. 
 
2. Chemistry and literature 
For Levi, chemistry was one of the principal 
elements of his intellectual, human and moral 
education. In Il sistema periodico, Levi recalls 
that, unlike his friend Enrico, for whom 
chemistry represented guarantees for a 
                                                 
3
 “Sulla prima, quella della fabbrica, non riesco 
nemmeno a lavorarci su con la penna e con la fantasia. 
Ho tentato di fare dei racconti sulla mia vita di fabbrica. 
Sono i peggiori. Non ci riuscirò mai, ne sono sicuro.” 
 
4
 “Mute e brute perché disperatamente monotone […] 
hanno virtù pratiche, ma non ‘dicono’ niente, o meglio, 
ripetono all’infinito lo stesso messaggio.” 
Visions for Sustainability 2: 36-48, 2014 
 
P a g e   | 38 
 
prosperous future, he decided to become a 
chemist because chemistry represented “a 
indefinite cloud of future powers” which 
enveloped his coming time “in black circles 
lacerated by lights of fire, like that which 
concealed the Sinai Mount.”5 Later, in a 
dialogue with the Italian scientist Tullio 
Regge, Levi remembered that during his time 
at the university, he was “substantially a 
romantic and also in chemistry it was the 
romantic aspect that interested me. I hoped 
to go very far, to the point of possessing the 
universe, to understand the why of things. 
Now I know it doesn’t exist, the why of things, 
at least that’s what I believe, but then I really 
believed in it” (Levi, 1984: 13)6. In addition to 
the laws of molecules, in chemistry Levi 
hoped to find the laws on which ethical choice 
is founded; therefore his decision to study 
chemistry “was substantially a research of 
meaning: a sort of construction of own 
personality in relation to that of cosmos” (Di 
Meo, 2011: 14)7, thanks to the knowledge of 
the laws that govern nature and of those 
which govern human beings, in their capacity 
as moral beings. Through chemistry, Levi 
learned to know nature by discovering the 
order that controls each one of its minimal 
parts, that is, molecules and cells; and 
moreover, he learned to know himself 
through the play of analogies between moral 
life and chemistry. Therefore, for Levi, 
literary writing also produced a sort of 
knowledge, because he considered it “like a 
learning process through tests and errors like 
(even though less reliable) the scientific one” 
                                                 
5
 “Una nuvola indefinita di potenze future”; “in nere 
volute lacerate da bagliori di fuoco, simile a quella che 
occultava il monte Sinai” (Levi, 1997g: 758). 
 
6
 “Sostanzialmente un romantico e anche della chimica 
mi interessava l’aspetto romantico, speravo di arrivare 
molto in là, di giungere a possedere la chiave 
dell’universo. Adesso so che non c’è il perché delle cose, 
almeno così credo, ma allora ci credevo abbastanza” 
(Levi, 1984: 13). 
 
7
 “Era stata principalmente una ricerca di significati: 
una sorta di costituzione della propria personalità in 
relazione a quella del cosmo.” 
(Cicioni, 1989: 265)8, composed by a series of 
essential actions: “filtering, distilling, 
decanting, sublimating, correcting, 
condensing, weighing, and separating” 
(Scarpa, 1997: 233)9. 
For Levi, the same actions that characterise 
the chemist’s work must characterise literary 
art, because if writing must communicate 
knowledge then it has to be clear, essential 
and ordered as if it arose from the work of an 
assembler able to bring together pieces into a 
balanced machine or from the work of a 
chemist who, by finding some sort of order in 
raw matter – the hyle10 –, gives a sense to the 
world. Both in scientific and in literary fields, 
order as conceived by Levi has a very 
particular meaning and differs deeply from 
the order of scientific thought, which from 
Galileo through Newton arrives, at its 
culmination, ‘to’ Positivism, where nature is a 
perfect mechanism. Consequently, from the 
positivistic standpoint, discovering nature’s 
laws corresponds to knowing the world 
objectively and to predicting, controlling and 
dominating it11. 
According to Levi, on the other hand, order is 
not an absolute connected to the concepts of 
perfection or purity. On the contrary, order is 
the fruit of the processes of knowledge and 
human activity aimed at creating those 
representations that permit the 
interpretation of life and at making sense out 
of it insofar as they adhere to historical 
reality. From this perspective, Levian order 
paradoxically has in itself the germ of 
disorder: by the same token, purity could not 
be what it is if it had not in itself the vital 
                                                 
8
 “Come un processo di apprendimento attraverso 




 “Filtrare, distillare, decantare, sublimare, rettificare, 
condensare, pesare, separare.” 
 
10




 This argument aroused interest in many authors: for 
deeper insight I refer to Feyerabend (2002). 
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germ of impurity. Literary writing ideally 
shares with technical writing clarity and 
simplicity, while technical writing shares with 
literary writing inexactitude: thus, the 
language of chemistry, although crystalline, 
maintains in itself something of the 
mysterious language of alchemy. Since 
inexactitude is necessary to life, if one speaks 
about true order one should also include its 
opposite, disorder: this means that in nature 
order “is such only when it stays in constant 
tension against the strengths that aim to 
desegregate it” (Cases, 1988: XII)12. In other 
words, order by contemplating the possibility 
of disorder and diversity distances itself from 
the concept of absolute purity, which has no 
correspondence in nature: for Levi, in 
chemistry as in literature purity is nothing 
more than the product of distillation, i.e. the 
product of that “slow, philosophic, and silent 
occupation, which keeps you busy but gives 
you time to think of other things” (Levi, 1995: 
34)13, and that produces metamorphosis, 
which consists in a sequence of changes of 
state ending with the increase in purity of 
elements. In this case too, one always needs 
to consider that purity can be obtained only if 
ab origine there is some impurity. For this 
reason Levi, rather than acclaiming purity to 
be like an ‘armour’ that protects from 
impurities – i.e. from evil – acclaims impurity 
without which life would not be: in fact, “in 
order for the wheel to turn, for life to be lived, 
impurities are needed […] but immaculate 
virtue does not exist either, or if it exists it is 
detestable” (37)14.   
 
                                                 
12
  “È tale solo quando è in continua tensione contro le 
forze che tendono a disgregarlo.” 
 
13
  “Mestiere lento, filosofico e silenzioso, che ti occupa 




 “Perché la ruota giri, perché la vita viva, ci vogliono le 
impurezze, e le impurezze delle impurezze […] neppure 
la virtù”;  “immacolata esiste, e se esiste è detestabile” 
(Levi, 1997g: 768). 
Another substantial difference between the 
two forms of writing is that while it is 
possible to learn how to write a factory 
report or any technical communication, it is 
quite impossible to learn how to write 
literature. This is not a transmittable 
profession like any other practical activity; at 
most, – as Levi wrote answering a letter by a 
“young reader” who asked for advice on how 
to narrate a story, – it is possible to give 
generic indications founded on one’s own 
experience and one’s own way of perceiving 
writing. Levi’s general advise consists in: 1. 
when the text is finished, leave it to decant 
because only after a few days “one almost 
always realises to have sinned by excess, that 
the text is redundant, repetitive, prolix: or at 
least, I repeat, that is what happens to me” 
(Levi, 1989b: 209)15; 2. try to give the largest 
amount of information in the smallest space, 
which is made possible by searching for a 
variety of possible synonyms and by choosing 
the most adequate, since “there is always one 
which is ‘more right’ than the others: but 
often it is necessary to look for it;” (209)16 3. 
be aware of the original meaning of words 
because thus only words can be used in the 
most appropriate way, as for example the 
word “unleash” used for “free from leashes 
[…] not all readers will notice the artifice, but 
they will at least perceive that the choice 
wasn’t obvious, that you have worked for 
them, that you have not followed the line of 
least resistance” (208)17 
 
 
                                                 
15
 “Ci si accorge che si è peccato per eccesso, che il testo 
è ridondante, ripetitivo, prolisso: o almeno, ripeto, così 
capita a me” (Levi, 1997h: 846). 
 
16
 “Ce n’è sempre uno che è ‘più giusto’ degli altri: ma 
spesso bisogna andarlo a cercare” (Levi, 1997h: 846). 
 
17
 “Togliere le catene […] non tutti i lettori si 
accorgeranno dell’artificio, ma tutti percepiranno 
almeno che la scelta non è stata ovvia, che Lei ha 
lavorato per loro, che non ha seguito la linea della 
massima pendenza” (Levi, 1997h: 847). 
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3. Writing as an experiment 
Levi believes that the impossibility of 
learning how to write literature is something 
good because if learning were possible “all 
writers would write in the same way, these 
generating such an enormous mass of 
boredom as to render vain any attempt to 
pass it off as Leopardian, and to trip the 
automatic switches of the most indulgent 
readers due to over-load” (207)18. Levi faces 
the problem of literary writing conceived as a 
reproduction of models in Storie Naturali 
(The Sixth Day and other Tales), which 
features a group of short stories whose main 
characters are the I-narrator and his 
antagonist, the American retailer of electronic 
machines “Signor Simpson”. These tales 
represent the promethean aspiration to 
reproduce life and its fundamental aspects by 
mechanical supports: mechanical 
reproduction of art (Il versificatore), of 
matter (L’ordine a buon mercato), of human 
beings (Alcune applicazioni del Mimete), of 
aesthetical judgment (La misura della 
bellezza), of work (Pieno impiego) and of 
experience (Trattamento di quiescenza). Il 
versificatore, the first tale devoted to the 
question of the technical reproduction of 
poetic language19, is the story of a poet who 
writes sonnets, hymns and other poetical 
compositions on demand for any occasion, 
weddings, funerals e other anniversaries. 
Overloaded with requests, one day he decides 
to buy from Signor Simpson the machine that 
produces mechanical poetic compositions, 
despite the doubts of his secretary who does 
not understand how a computer could 
substitute artistic genius and its sensibility, 
fantasy and taste:   
                                                 
18 “Tutti gli scrittori scriverebbero allo stesso modo, 
generando così una mole di noia tale da vanificare 
qualunque tentativo di farla passare per leopardiana, e 
da far scattare per sovraccarico gli interruttori 
automatici dei lettori più indulgenti” (Levi, 1997h: 846). 
 
19
 The text is structured as a theatrical pièce with 
dramatis personae at the beginning (the poet, the 
secretary, signor Simpson, il versificatore, Giovanni) 
and a prologue. 
Secretary: Maestro… I… I have worked with 
you for fifteen years… so… forgive me, but… 
if I were in your shoes I would never do 
such a thing. I do not say that for me, you 
know: but a poet, an artist like you… how 
can you accept to have a machine at home 
[…] as modern as you wish, but just a 
machine […] how can it have your taste, 
your sensibility. (Levi, 1997d: 419)20 
The mechanism of the machine is really easy: 
it is sufficient to insert three or four words, 
then choose tone, style, genre, and finally the 
metrical form. As first test to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the machine, the poet 
paradoxically chooses the theme “limits of 
human genius. Jerk, buzzer, three signals 
short and one long”, and after that the 
versificator, with a ‘metallic voice” says: 
Oh foolish brain, why d’you stretch your bow? 
Why, though in the struggle that makes you 
you waste your hours night and day 
he lied, he lied who described you as sacred 
The lust of following knowledge 
And as fine honey its acre juice. (424)21 
In this first test there is already something 
strange: the word ‘acro’, for example, does 
not sound Italian to the poet’s ear because the 
correct word is ‘acre’. But, as it is written in 
the vade mecum, the machine is able to 
produce poetic license in order to create 
proper rhymes. In addition it almost seems 
that the machine is capable of feeling 
emotion. When, asked about free time, it 
answers: 
                                                 
20
 “Segretaria: maestro… io… io lavoro con lei da 
quindici anni… ecco, mi perdoni, ma… al suo posto non 
farei mai una cosa simile. Non lo dico mica per me, sa: 
ma un poeta, un artista come lei… come può rassegnarsi 
a mettersi in casa una macchina […] moderna finché 
vuole, ma sarà sempre una macchina […] come potrà 
avere il suo gusto, la sua sensibilità.” 
 
21
 Cerèbro folle, a che pur l’arco tendi? / A che pur, nel 
travaglio onde se’ macro / Consumi l’ore, e dì e notte 
intendi? / Mentì, mentì chi ti descrisse sacri / Il disio di 
seguire conoscenza / E il miele delicato il suo succo 
acro. 
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A girl to take to bed 
Nothing is better, so they say. 
I would not dislike a try. 
What an experience would it be: 
But for her, o poor girl, what a pain! 
This frame of mine is too hard. 
Brass, bronze, cast iron and Bakelite; 
She pushes her hand and meets a screw; 
she tends her lips and finds a brush; 
she holds me to her breast  
and shock’s all what she gets (428)22. 
For Levi, unlike the others praxes that 
produce tangible objects, poiesis does not 
need manual skill because poetry is born, not 
from the hand – which Levi considers a ‘noble 
organ” (Levi, 1984: 20) – but from an 
intellectual act. For this reason, from the final 
ironic overturning, where the narrator 
confesses that the whole tale is the product of 
the machine, it follows  that computer could 
be a very useful means because it facilitates 
writing thanks to the “facility of cancelling, 
correcting, adding and replacing;”(Levi, 
1997b: 1264)23 but its services like “to mark 
rhymes, repetitions, alliterations, and 
anaphors voluntary or not… they will never 
make a poet out of a laic and they will never 
exalt his genius nor will they, nevertheless, 
degrade it.”24 Essentially, Levi considers 
writing performed by computer as a means of 
literary writing because even if he cannot 
provide scientific demonstration, he believes 
that a computer can only accomplish logical 
operations and therefore produces syntheses 
from fortuitous combinations of words, while 
                                                 
22
 Una ragazza da portare a letto/Non c’è nulla di 
meglio, mi hanno detto./ Non mi dispiacerebbe far la 
prova,/Per me sarebbe un’esperienza nuova:/Ma per 
lei, poveretta, che tortura!/Quest’intelaiatura è troppo 
dura./Ottone, bronzo, ghisa, bachelite:/Tende la mano 
ed incontra una vite/Tende le labbra ed incontra una 
brossa/Mi stringe al seno, e si prende la scossa 
 
23
 “Facilità con cui si cancella, corregge, aggiunge e 
sostituisce” (Levi, 1997b: 1264). 
 
24
 “Segnalare le rime, le ripetizioni, le allitterazioni, le 
anafore, volontarie o no… non faranno mai di un laico 
un poeta né di un poeta esalteranno la vena; ma 
neppure gliela inquineranno” (Levi, 1997b: 1265). 
 
“poetry is higher that logic and chance: it can 
contain both of them in itself, but is wider” 
(Levi, 1997c: 1266)25. In fact, when choosing 
words, the versificatore works mechanically 
because it has not the aesthetic-critical ability 
to value and to choose on the basis of 
judgment. What differentiates literal and 
technical writing is, in the last analysis, the 
faculty of judgment founded on aesthetic 
sentiment26. 
This is the theme of the short story called La 
misura della bellezza, where during the 
summer holiday the narrator meets Signor 
Simpson on the beach, occupied on a curious 
activity: pictures with an odd machine of all 
pedestrians, whatever they look like, young, 
old, women, or men. The secret is soon 
revealed: Simpson is actually testing a new 
product aimed at measuring the level of 
beauty in people. In this case too, the 
functioning of the machine is really basic: one 
just has to give coordinates concerning two 
models of beauty, one for men and one for 
women, and later to verify how the machine 
has evaluated people’s appearance. According 
to the philosophy of the new machine, beauty 
“is relative to a model, variable at will, at the 
judgment of fashion” (Levi, 1991: 85)27, 
therefore in order to be considered beautiful 
one just needs to stay within determined 
                                                 
25
 “La poesia è maggiore della logica e del caso: può 
contenerli in sé entrambi, ma è più ampia.” 
26
 According to Kant, the aesthetic sentiment is the 
agreement born form the free play between our 
faculties, imagination and intellect, with which the 
judgment of taste is determinate: for this reason there is 
not any concept a priori at the ground of the statement 
this thing is beautiful. “Such a judgment is an aesthetic 
judgment on the purposiveness of the object and does 
not furnish one […] this pleasure in the representation 
of such an object – with its representation this pleasure 
is also judged to be necessarily combined, consequently 
not merely for the subject who apprehends this form 
but for everyone who judges at all. The object is then 
called beautiful; and the faculty for judging through 
such a pleasure (consequently also with universal 
validity) is called taste” (Kant, 76). 
 
27
 “È relativa a un modello, variabile a piacere, ad 
arbitrio della moda” (Levi, 1997d: 500). 
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parameters chosen a priori. Further, in this 
tale it is the feminine character, the wife of 
the I-narrator, who raises doubts about the 
presumed practical and moral validity of the 
machine: rather than an evaluator of beauty 
the contraption seems to be a means to 
measure conformity “and is therefore an 
exquisitely conformist instrument” (88)28. 
For Levi, beauty and all that concerns 
aesthetics and ethics can neither be 
determined by a model, nor established by 
the whims of the fashion market, nor by the 
principle of de gustibus non disputandum est. 
If in all aesthetic judgments beauty cannot be 
regulated by any determinate norm, then 
beauty is ungraspable and this means that it 
can be recognised but not defined29. For this 
reason Levi states that it is possible to learn a 
technique, a manual work but  
how to write poetry cannot be taught in 
school: for the same reasons why nobody is 
taught how to speak or walk. These are 
activities to which we are genetically 
predisposed and that we learn to perform 
easily and with pleasure, although not 
spontaneously. We do not need for study; 
we just need examples, which is enough; 
starting from that each of us develops the 
personal style that characterized his wit, 
walking style as well as his verse.  (Levi, 
1997c: 943)30 
                                                 
28
  “E quindi uno strumento squisitamente conformista” 
(Levi, 1997d: 502). 
 
29
 However, the aesthetic judgment of its very nature is 
universal even if it has not any concept at its basis. This 
means that it is not possible to say everybody must 
judge this object to be Beautiful; it is possible to say that 




 “Poetare non s’insegna a scuola: per gli stessi motivi 
non s’insegna a parlare né a camminare. Sono tutte 
attività per cui siamo geneticamente predisposti, e che 
impariamo a svolgere con facilità e piacere, anche se 
non spontaneamente. Non ci occorre lo studio, ci 
occorre (e basta) l’esempio; a partire dal quale, ognuno 
di noi sviluppa quello stile personale che informa la sua 
parola, il suo passo e il suo verso.” 
Through examples, which only show 
possibilities but do not produce any norms on 
how to act, one perfects his own ability in 
writing, while building his own style. In fact, if 
there were a model to establish what beauty 
is, or what good is insofar as a model 
represents a perfect prototype, then aesthetic 
and ethical judgments would be founded on a 
pre-judgement. In this case, literature would 
be deprived of its purpose, i.e. to bring clarity 
to those aspects of existence that cannot be 
known rigorously via scientific definition 
since they are not within the necessity of 
nature’s cause and effect process. The most 
significant difference between technical and 
literary writing resides in the fact that while 
the former permits the definition and 
description of the object, the latter, on the 
contrary, allows the representation of the 
possibilities of the object. In both cases, 
clarity must be an essential quality because, 
in its absence, what the writer wants to 
express risks not being understood and 
appearing confused. In La chiave a stella the 
protagonist Faussone, a technician in 
industrial works, is always clear when 
narrates his adventures connected with his 
work, and although he very often opens 
digressions or uses dialect word forms, his 
speech is always comprehensible to his 
listener. Therefore, when at the end of the 
book his listener, i.e. Primo Levi, narrates his 
own story, Faussone immediately stops him 
to ask for clarification:   
hold it a minute. While I was telling you 
stories about my job, you have to admit, I 
never took advantage. I know you’re all 
pleased with yourself now, but you mustn’t 
take advantage, either. You have to tell 
things so people can understand; otherwise 
the game’s over. Or are you already on the 
other side: one of those people who write 
and then the reader has to fend for himself 
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since he’s already paid for the book 
anyway? (Levi, 1987: 169)31 
The interplay of narration on the one hand 
requires the narrator’s willingness to be 
understood by his listener and, on the other 
hand, the latter’s willingness to receive the 
story without interrupting with questions 
that break the rhythm, and force the narrator 
to give explanations irrelevant to the story 
itself. While Faussone tells the story of an 
error made during his work, his listener 
wants to stop him to ask for deeper insight, 
but he restrains himself  
to keep from a spoiling his story. In fact, 
just as there is an art of story-telling, 
strictly codified through a thousand trials 
and errors, so there is also an art of 
listening, equally ancient and noble, but as 
far as I know, it has never been given any 
norm. And yet every narrator is aware 
from experience that to every narration the 
listener makes a decisive contributing: a 
distracted or hostile audience can unnerve 
any teacher or lecturer; a friendly public 
sustains.  (35)32 
As the listener engages himself in listening, so 
the narrator himself engages in telling things 
as they occurred: therefore, Faussone tells the 
truth. The fact that stories are sometimes told 
                                                 
31
 “Un momento. Finché sono stato o a raccontarle le 
storie del mio mestiere, lei o deve ammettere, io non ho 
mai profittato. Capisco che oggi lei è contento, ma anche 
lei non deve approfittarsene. Deve raccontare le cose in 
una maniera che si capiscano, se non non è più un gioco. 
O non è che lei è già dall’altra parte, di quelli che 
scrivono e poi quello che legge si arrangia, tanto orami il 
libro lo ha già comprato” (Levi, 1997f: 1103). 
 
32
 “Come avesse potuto commettere una dimenticanza 
così grave, ma mi sono trattenuto per non guastare il 
suo racconto. Infatti, come c’è l’arte di raccontare, 
solidamente codificata attraverso mille prove ed errori, 
così c’è pure un’arte dell’ascoltare, altrettanto antica e 
nobile, a cui tuttavia, che io sappia, non è stata mai data 
norma. Eppure, ogni narratore sa per esperienza che ad 
ogni narrazione l’astratto od ostile snerva qualsiasi 
conferenza o lezione, un pubblico amico la conforta” 
(Levi, 1997f; 973). 
 
with emphasis does not mean that they are 
false; Faussone explains: “I don’t believe 
that’s a sin, because anybody who listens to 
me catches on immediately” (99)33. If one 
pretends to play, if one or the other breaks 
the implicit narrative pact, the play loses its 
meaning. For Levi, when literature loses 
clarity it misses its aim because if the aim of 
writing is to communicate then anyone who 
utilizes abstruse language “who is not 
understood by anyone does not transmit 
anything, he cries in the desert” (Levi, 1989b: 
159)34. 
 
4. The ethical consequences of 
language 
Communication is so important for Levi that 
in I sommersi e i salvati he defines the 
obscurity of language as a sin that leads to 
incomprehension: “one can and must 
communicate […] to say that it is impossible 
to communicate is a failing; one always can” 
(Levi, 1988: 68-69)35. Thus, there is a cross-
reference of analogies between the modus 
scribendi and the modus vivendi, as a 
consequence bad writing is an immoral act 
that impedes communication and as such 
produces evil; so that in comparison with 
chemistry, “bad writing, therefore, would be 
like realising non-plausible molecules” (Di 
Meo, 2011: 49)36. In Levi the tendency 
towards clarity and simplicity of language, 
which does not leave any space to the 
oratorium artificium, had developed since he 
was at the university, i.e. since when “the 
direct confrontation with matter, the analysis, 
                                                 
33
 “Credo che non sia peccato, perché tanto chi sta a 
sentire si accorge subito” (Levi, 1997f: p. 1034). 
34
  “Non viene capito da nessuno, non trasmette nulla, 
grida nel deserto” (Levi, 1997h: 678). 
 
35
 “Comunicare si può e si deve […] Negare che 
comunicare si può è falso: si può sempre. Rifiutare di 
comunicare è colpa” (Levi, 1997e: 1059-1060). 
 
36
  “Scrivere male sarebbe, dunque, come realizzare 
molecole non plausibili.” 
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the experimental research became the key to 
face the world, to build the self and to 
understand the other” (Mattioda, 2011: 16)37. 
When the other is transfigured into literary 
language, he must be represented not in a 
rhetorical but rather in an essential way. In 
La chiave a Stella the narrator says: 
I promised Faussone I would be very 
careful to follow his indications, and under 
no circumstances would I yield to the 
professional temptation to invent, 
embellish, and expand; and therefore I 
would add nothing to his report, though I 
might pare away a little, as the sculptor 
does when he carves the form from the 
block. And Faussone declared himself in 
agreement. (Levi, 1987: 113)38 
While simplicity in technical writing means 
simplification of language and thought, in 
literary writing it paradoxically means union 
of ‘clear and difficult’, ‘easy and complex’ 
because if writing means making order, then 
one needs not “to respond chaos of universe 
whit chaos of writing” (Scarpa, 1997: 128-
9)39. Therefore, Levi “does not love nor looks 
for ambiguities, in which sometimes poetry 
dwells, but also the blurring of values” (Segre, 
1989: VIII)40 and constantly shows antipathy 
for “the vague and imprecise words, the cult 
of the exact expression, of the well sorted 
synonymous,  are in fact the linguistic 
                                                 
37
  “Il confronto diretto con la materia, l’analisi, la 
ricerca sperimentale diventavano le chiavi con le quali 
affrontare il mondo, costruire il sé e comprendere 
l’altro”. 
38
  “Ho promesso a Faussone che mi sarei attenuto con 
la miglior diligenza alle sue indicazioni; che in nessun 
caso avrei ceduto alla tentazione professionale 
dell’inventare, dell’abbellire e dell’arrotondare; che 
perciò al suo resoconto non avrei aggiunto niente, ma 
forse qualche cosa avrei tolto, come fa o scultore 
quando ricava la forma dal blocco; e lui si è dichiarato 
d’accordo” (Levi, 1997f: 1048). 
 
39




  “Non ama e non cerca l’ambiguità, in cui talora 
risiede la poesia, ma anche la confusione dei valori.” 
 
correspondence of the difference between 
sodium and potassium” (Cases, 1990: 23)41. 
These two elements differ from one another 
because potassium in contact with air reacts 
more energetically than sodium, and in water 
it reacts with hydrogen and becomes 
inflammable, as Levi himself would 
experience during an experiment of 
distillation: he decided to pour potassium 
instead of sodium into a ball from which, 
when brought in contact with water, a flame 
came out toward the window and put the 
curtains on fire, so saturating the air with 
smoke. Moral of the tale: from this chemical 
experience Levi learnt to “distrust the almost-
the-same […] the practically identical, the 
approximate, the or-even, all surrogates, and 
all patchwork” (Levi, 1995: 65)42, because 
from differences, even if minimal, serious 
consequences could flow. The same happens 
with words, which means that, because 
names represent the essence of things, 
nominating things always implies 
consequences: on the one hand “give a name 
to thing is gratifying like give a name to an 
isle”; on the other hand it is dangerous 
because after the object has been baptised 
there is the risk of “becoming convinced that 
all is taken care of and that once named the 
phenomenon has also been explained” (Levi, 
1989b: 146)43. 
 
                                                 
41
  “Le parole vaghe e imprecise, il culto 
dell’espressione esatta, del sinonimo ben scelto, sono 
infatti il corrispondente linguistico della differenza tra 
sodio e potassio.” 
42
 “Diffidare del quasi-uguale […] del praticamente 
identico, del pressappoco, dell’oppure, di tutti i 
surrogati e di tutti i rappezzi” (Levi, 1997g: 791). 
 
43
 “Dare un nome a una cosa è gratificante come dare il 
nome a un’isola “;“convincersi che il più sia fatto e che il 
fenomeno battezzato sia anche spiegato” (Levi, 1997h: 
759). 
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5. Metaphors and similitudes 
As for Aristotle, according to whom every 
discourse is “significant not like a natural 
instrument, but conventionally,” (Aristotele, 
2011: §4 17a 34, p. 60)44 so also for Levi a 
name (ònoma) does not derive from a divine 
mind but is a conventional sound and a 
graphical sign created by men. To pronounce 
the name of things does not mean to know 
what the thing is. However, while in scientific 
language words have to possess one and only 
one meaning and have to indicate one and 
only one object in order not to create 
confusion, in literary language they have to be 
able to express a different meaning from the 
usual one, i.e. a translated meaning. The 
translated meaning is fundamental in cases 
where one has to speak about something 
whose very nature escapes logical language: 
ethics, aesthetics and religion45. In these cases 
words and propositions cannot have a logical 
equivalent in reality and therefore do not 
                                                 
44
 “Significativo non già alla maniera di uno strumento 
naturale, bensì, secondo quanto si è detto, per 
convenzione.” 
45
  The world, i.e.  “the world is all that is the case” 
(Wittgenstein, 2010, 5, prop. 1), is composed of  the 
totality of facts, i.e. of the relations between the ‘state of 
affairs” (5, prop. 2). For Wittgenstein states of affairs 
are represented by language because there is a 
correspondence, or better an logical homology, between 
them: the image of a proposition “can depict any reality 
whose form it has” (11, prop. 2.171) but it cannot 
represent its own form of depiction but only exhibit it. 
This because “in order to be able to represent logical 
form, we should have to be able to station ourselves 
with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to 
say outside the world,” (31, prop. 4.12) but this is not 
possible: philosophy can only be delimited by the 
borders of the natural sciences, i.e. what can be 
thinkable from inside. That means that “what cannot be 
said, by presenting clearly what can be said” (30, prop. 
4.115). Ethics cannot be said because it “is 
transcendental” (86, prop. 6.421) For Wittgenstein, 
being a sentiment and not a fact of the world, ethics 
cannot be expressed in logical language. For this reason 
Wittgenstein writes in the Preface of the Tractatus that 
“what can be said at all be said can be said clearly, and 
what we cannot talk about we must pass over in 
silence.” (3) and finishes with one solitary proposition: 
“what we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence” (109, prop. 7). 
refer to a fact or a state of affairs. He affirmed 
that the statement ‘in the situation x it is 
really cold’ does not give any idea of the 
intensity of the coldness in question, but it is 
like affirming that ‘in the situation x people 
are really hungry’ does not give any idea of 
the intensity of hunger. One does however 
feel the need to ‘have to tell’ that urges to go 
beyond the insufficiency of logical language, 
in order to discover different ways of 
expression, like metaphor. In metaphor 
words are used in an allotropic and foreign 
way unlike in their common use; in metaphor, 
a different possible use of words is shown, 
one which produces new sense. For this 
reason metaphor does not explain anything 
and does not refer to anything real but puts 
before our eyes what is habitually veiled46. 
This capability also constitutes the danger of 
metaphor precisely because the fact that it 
does not refer to a state of affairs and because 
it does not explain anything but only shows 
what could not be achieved in other way, it 
can miss its purpose, which is producing 
knowledge: in this case metaphor is not 
created in a proper way and produces 
confusion. Levi, in La chiave a stella, 
reprimands Faussone by telling him: 
 you have to be careful with similes, 
because they may be poetic, but they don’t 
prove much, so you have to watch your step 
in drawing educational or edifying lessons 
from them. Should the educator take as his 
model the smith, who roughly pounds the 
iron and gives it shape and nobility […] 
beware of analogies: for millennia they 
corrupted medicine, and it may be their 
fault that today’s pedagogical system are 
so numerous, and after three thousand 
                                                 
46
  In Rhetoric Aristotle writes that metaphors produce 
knowledge when they are well formed, i.e. when tõ 
poieîn tò prãgma prò Ommátôn they put “the matter 
before the eyes,” (2, 1405b, p. 359.) 
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years of argument we still don’t actually 
know which is best.  (Levi, 1987: 77)47  
The metaphor and similitude do not 
determine anything and their sense is always 
imprecise and vague: for this reason they 
cannot be interpreted literally and cannot be 
used where stricter rigour is instead 
required, i.e. in scientific statements. Half 
ironically, the narrator tells Faussone that 
unlike in practical arts imprecision of literary 
words does not kill anybody:  
on the towers we construct they don’t run 
any high-tension lines; if our structure fall, 
nobody gets killed, and they don’t have to 
be wind-resistant. In other words, we’re 
irresponsible, and no writer has ever been 
put on trial or sent to jail because his 
constructions came apart. (52)48  
But a writer has great responsibility because, 
even if he cannot be legally accused in the 
event of writing a bad book, his writing would 
affect reality: telling a false story pretending 
it to be real or formulating a metaphor that 
creates confusion and not clarity has moral 
consequences. Therefore, on the one hand, 
metaphors are necessary to show that of 
which one cannot speak and to produce that 
sort of knowledge that could not be achieved 
in other way: on the other hand, when 
metaphor is only used as rhetorical 
embellishment that does not produce 
                                                 
47
 “Che con le similitudini bisogna stare attenti, perché 
magari sono poetiche ma dimostrano poco: perciò si 
deve andare cauti nel ricavarne indicazioni educative-
edificanti. Deve l’educatore rendere esempio dal 
fucinatore, che battendo rudemente il ferro gli dà 
nobiltà e forma […] alla larga dalle analogie: hanno 
corrotto la medicina per millenni e forse è colpa loro se 
oggi i sistemi pedagogici sono così numerosi, e dopo 
tremila anni di discussione non si sa ancora bene quale 
sia il migliore” (Levi, 1997f: 1013). 
48
 “Sui tralicci che costruiamo noi non passano i cavi ad 
alta tensione, se crollano non muore nessuno, e non 
devono neppure resistere al vento. Siamo insomma 
degli irresponsabili, e non si è mai visto che uno 
scrittore vada sotto processo o finisca in galera perché 
le sue strutture si sono sfasciate” (Levi, 1997f: 988). 
 
knowledge, it is also deprived of its ethical 
value. The question is complex if one thinks 
that while it is possible to teach the technique 
to assemble a stable tower fit for its purpose, 
there is no possibility of teaching anyone how 
to compose good metaphors49, “unless, 
indeed, I teach him some way of hearkening, 
some kind of receptivity” (Wittgenstein, 
1958: 87, §232). 
The problem of how to be able to 
metaphorize concerns the individual because 
it is a personal virtue that cannot be taught 
but could at most be shown in examples. It is 
not easy, indeed, to say when a metaphor is 
good or bad: this may be due either to some 
lack of perspicuity or most easily, a lack of 
willingness to acknowledge errors; in La 
chiave a stella Levi explains Faussone that 
it’s easier to see if a piece of metal 
structure is ‘right on the bubble’ than a 
written page; so you can write a page with 
enthusiasm, or even a whole book, and then 
you realize it won’t do, that it’s a botch, 
silly, unoriginal, incomplete, excessive, 
futile […] but it can also happen that you 
write some things that really are botched 
and futile (and this happens often) but you 
don’t realize it, which is far more possible, 
because paper is too tolerant a material. 
You can write any old absurdity on it, and 
it never complains: id doesn’t act like the 
beams in mine tunnels that creak when 
they’re overburdened and are about to 
cave in. In the job of writing the 
instruments, the alarm systems are 
rudimentary: there isn’t even a trustworthy 
equivalent of the T square or the 
plumbline. But if a page is wrong the 
reader notices, and by then it is too late, 
and the situation is bad, also because that 
page is your work, only yours: you have no 
                                                 
49
 Aristotle writes: “above all that which gives 
perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air and it cannot be 
learnt from anyone else” (Aristotle, 1975: 355, III, 
1405a §2). 
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excuses or pretext; you are totally 
responsible. (Levi, 1987, p. 48)50   
Unlike the common use of words that 
everybody can understand, the metaphorical 
use of words is possible thanks to the ability 
to see connections and to have “an eye for 
resemblances” (Aristotle, 1973: 91, §22, 
1459a 3-7) or seeing similarities. From this 
point of view the exactitude-inexactitude of 
literary language differs from scientific 
language because it has its origin in metaphor 
that, for Levi, does not have a function of 
embellishment but has a “actualizing and 
cognitive function” (Segre, 1988: LXIII). 
Therefore, metaphor with its capability to 
show similarity in dissimilarity has an ethical 
and cognitive value: where the exactitude of 
technical language fails as inadequate, the 
exactitude-inexactitude of literary language 
becomes essential. But the exactitude-
inexactitude of literature has to be supported 
every time by the ethical will because, for 
Levi, the writer carries great responsibility 
for what he writes “word by word” (Levi, 
1989b: 162). The writer, in conclusion, must 
decide not to lie and not to use the privileged 
form of literature, the metaphor, as a 
rhetorical embellishment in order to create 
                                                 
50 “È facile accertarsi se è ‘in bolla d’aria’ una 
carpenteria metallica che non una pagina scritta: così 
può capitare che uno scriva con entusiasmo una pagina, 
o anche un libro intero, e poi si accorga che non va bene, 
che è pasticciato, sciocco, già scritto, mancante, 
eccessivo, inutile […] Ma può anche capitare che uno 
scriva delle cose, appunto, pasticciate e inutili (e questo 
accade di sovente) e non se ne accorga e non se ne 
voglia accorgere, il che è ben possibile, perché la carta è 
un materiale troppo tollerante. La puoi scrivere sopra 
qualunque enormità, e non protesta mai: non fa come il 
legname delle armature nelle gallerie di miniera, che 
scricchiola quando è sovraccarico e sta per venire un 
crollo. Nel mestiere di scrivere la strumentazione e i 
segnali d’allarme sono rudimentali: non c’è neppure un 
equivalente affidabile della squadra e del filo a piombo. 
Ma se una pagina non va se ne accorge chi legge, quando 
ormai è troppo tardi, e allora si mette male: anche 
perché quella pagina è opera tua e solo tua, non hai 
scuse né pretesti, ne rispondi appieno” (Levi, 1997f: 
984-985). 
 
aestheticizing effects, but he must decide to 
use it to represent that which could not 
otherwise be represented. It is a fundamental 
imperative for the writer to choose ethical 
writing because what happens in history “can 
happen, and it can happen everywhere […] it 
is necessary to sharpen our senses, distrust 
the prophets, the enchanters, those who 
speak and write ‘beautiful words’ 
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